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Abstract
Why don't people buy annuities? Several explanations have been provided by
the previous literature: large fraction of preannuitized wealth in retirees' portfo-
lios; adverse selection; bequest motives; and medical expense uncertainty. This
paper uses a quantitative model to assess the importance of these impediments
to annuitization and also studies three newer explanations: government safety net
in terms of means-tested transfers; illiquidity of housing wealth; and restrictions
on minimum amount of investment in annuities. This paper shows that quantita-
tively four explanations play a big role in reducing annuity demand: preannuitized
wealth, minimum annuity purchase requirement, illiquidity of housing wealth, and
bequest motives. The annuity purchase involves big upfront investment, especially
if there is a minimum purchase restriction. This is binding for many, especially
if housing is illiquid and part of wealth is preannuitized. While bequest motives
signicantly reduce the overall annuity demand, the model with a strong bequest
motive cannot match the empirical fact that high-income people have the highest
demand for annuities.
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1 Introduction
A well-known prediction of the standard life-cycle model is that in the presence of
lifespan uncertainty, people should invest in nothing but annuities (Yaari, 1965). In
practice few people buy annuities. This empirical fact is called the "annuity puzzle".
The literature seeking to explain this puzzle has mainly attributed the lack of interest
in annuities to the following four factors: a substantial fraction of preannuitized wealth
in retirees' portfolios, actuarially unfair prices, bequest motives, and uncertain health
expenses. It is still an open question, however, what is the relative quantitative impor-
tance of dierent explanations for the annuity puzzle. The goal of this paper is therefore
to provide a quantitative analysis of people's decisions to buy annuities in a model that
nests all major impediments to annuitization.
I develop a quantitative model of saving after retirement in which individuals face
lifespan uncertainties that create a demand for longevity insurance. At the same time
the available annuities are illiquid, i.e., they entitle a person to a constant stream of
income that cannot be converted back to liquid wealth. The other key features of the
model are uncertain medical expenses, bequest motives, preannuitized wealth, and the
government-provided minimum consumption level. Augmented in this way, the life-cycle
model allows for states, when it is not optimal for an individual to lock his wealth in a
constant stream of income.
Another important feature of the model is that annuity prices are determined in
equilibrium. When modeling the annuity market I compare two information structures.
In the rst, the insurer and the annuity buyer have the same information about the
mortality of the latter. In the second, there is asymmetric information, and the insurer
can only observe the age of the annuity buyer. The latter scenario creates an environment
for adverse selection which is intensied by the negative correlation between wealth and
mortality. This happens because retirees with low mortality buy more annuities because
they not only expect to live longer but are also wealthier.
The main quantitative exercise of this paper consists of comparing annuity market
participation rates between the models that incorporate dierent impediments to annu-
itization. I study seven explanations for the annuity puzzle: four traditional ones and
three factors that have been studied much less. The latter include government provided
social assistance, diculties with annuitizing housing wealth, and a minimum purchase
requirement set by insurance companies.
The consumption minimum oor, among other things, provides nancial support for
people if they outlive their assets and thus oers some longevity insurance. This public
longevity insurance may partially substitute for a private annuity, at least for low-income
retirees.
Another possible impediment to annuitization arises because annuities pay o over a
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long period of time and, as such, involve a big upfront investment. When it comes to buy-
ing an annuity, liquidity constraints may therefore become an issue because, rst, housing
wealth may not be easily annuitized and, second, insurance rms place restrictions on
the minimum amount that can be invested in an annuity.
Housing wealth has properties that distinguish it from other assets. It is less liquid
and also it can provide utility benets from homeownership. The fact that housing is
decumulated at a substantially slower rate than other types of wealth suggests that re-
tirees treat housing dierently from other assets.1 Since housing constitutes a signicant
portion of retirement wealth, this can also aect the retirees' willingness to annuitize.
Another consideration is that from the point of view of an economic model, an indi-
vidual may nd it rational to buy $1 worth of annuity. In reality insurance companies set
some restrictions on the minimum amount of investment in an annuity. The minimum
premium for a life annuity varies across insurance companies but can go up to $100,000.
I nd that the following four factors play a major role in reducing annuity mar-
ket participation rates: preannuitized wealth, minimum annuity purchase requirements,
illiquidity of housing wealth, and bequest motives. Bequest motives also result in a
non-monotone relationship between income and annuity demand which goes in contrast
with the data. The consumption minimum oor can be very important if there is no
preannuitized wealth. Adverse selection decreases the annuity demand only for people in
low income quintiles, while for higher quintiles it has an opposite eect. Because of this
its overall eect is small. Uncertain medical expenses have a small impact on annuity
ownership rates but noticeably aect the life-cycle patterns of annuitization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents
the model. Section 4 describes the data and calibration. Section 5 presents and discusses
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it belongs to the literature
that studies the annuity puzzle. The literature seeking to explain this puzzle has identi-
ed four factors that may play a major role in reducing the demand for annuities on the
part of single retirees. First, individuals already have a substantial fraction of annuities
in their portfolio provided by Social Security and Dened Benets (DB) pension plans
(Dushi and Webb, 2004). Second, the prices for annuities are actuarially unfair due to
the presence of adverse selection (Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky, 1997). Third,
annuitized wealth cannot be bequeathed, thus individuals with bequest motives should
1Nakajima and Telyukova (2011) describe in detail the empirical patterns of housing and non-housing
wealth decumulation after retirement.
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have lower demand for annuities (Lockwood, 2012a). Fourth, the attractiveness of an-
nuities can decrease in the presence of a health uncertainty. The possibility of incurring
high medical expenses increases preferences for liquid wealth as opposed to an illiquid
annuity (Turra and Mitchell, 2008). Also high medical expenses coincide with health
deterioration, which increases mortality and decreases the value of an annuity (Sinclair
and Smetters, 2004). The contribution of my study to the literature on the annuity
puzzle is twofold. First, it extends the list of commonly studied factors contributing to
the annuity puzzle. Second, it provides a relative quantitative assessment of all these
impediments to annuitization.
The second strand of literature this paper is related to studies equilibrium in the an-
nuity markets in the presence of adverse selection. Hosseini (2009) evaluates the benets
of the mandatory annuitization feature of Social Security. He considers an equilibrium
where agents dier only by their mortality. Walliser (1999) studies the eects of Social
Security on the private annuity market. He constructs an environment where agents are
heterogeneous both by mortality and income and allows for the income-mortality corre-
lation. I augment the heterogeneity of individuals by health and medical expenses, which
allows me to get a more detailed picture of the eects of adverse selection on dierent
categories of population.
3 Model
Consider a portfolio choice model of a single retiree who decides how much to save and
how to split his net worth between bonds and annuities while facing uncertain lifespan
and out-of-pocket medical expenses.2
Agents are heterogeneous by age, health status, initial endowment of wealth, and
permanent income. Permanent income represents annuity-like income that an agent is
entitled to receive during his retirement years. It consists of Social Security and DB
pension wealth and it is an indicator of the agents' lifetime earnings. In addition, it
aects survival probability, health evolution and medical expenses.
3.1 Households
3.1.1 Preferences
Denote the age of an individual by t; t = 1; :::T; where T is the last period of life.
Households are assumed to have CRRA preferences:
2I consider only singles because annuitization decisions of married households can be dierent since
couples have an option to buy joint annuities. This type of annuity continues payments as long as at
least one of the spouses is alive and it allows for payout options that cannot be achieved by single-life
annuity products (Brown and Poterba, 2000).
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u(ct) =
c1 t
1  
and enjoy leaving a bequest. Utility from the bequest takes the following functional form:
(kt) = 
(+ kt)
1 
1  
with  > 0: Here  > 0 is a shift parameter making bequests luxury goods, thus allowing
for zero bequests among low-income individuals.
3.1.2 Health, survival, and medical expenses
In specifying medical expenses and survival uncertainty, I follow De Nardi, French,
and Jones (2010) (hereafter DFJ). Their framework is well-suited for studying hetero-
geneity in annutization decisions because they explicitly model the relationships among
several factors which aect the demand for annuities: income, life expectancy, and med-
ical expenses.3
Each period an individual's health status mt can be good (mt = 1) or bad (mt = 0).
The transition between health states is governed by a Markov process with a transition
matrix depending on age (t) and permanent income (I). The probability of being in bad
health tomorrow given the current health status is denoted by Pr(mt+1 = 0jmt; t; I).
An individual survives to the next period conditional on being alive today with prob-
ability st, where sT = 0: Survival is a function of age, permanent income and current
health status: st = s(m; I; t).
Each period, an agent has to pay medical costs, zt, which are assumed to take the
following form:
ln zt = (m; t; I) + z t; (1)
The unconditional mean of medical expenses (exp ((m; t; I) + 0:52z)) is a function of
age, health, and permanent income. The stochastic part of medical expenses  t consists
of persistent and transitory components.
 t = t + t; t  N(0; 2)
The persistent component is modeled as an AR(1) process:
t = hct 1 + "t; "t  N(0; 2") (2)
3In the DFJ model there is an additional state variable that aects health uncertainty and mortality:
gender. My model does not include gender, so, when using the DFJ estimates, the eect of gender on all
the variables was averaged out. Adding gender will complicate the computation of the annuity market
equilibrium. Since gender is an observed characteristic, adding it will double the number of prices I need
to compute.
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I denote the joint conditional distribution of t and t by F (t; tjt 1).
3.1.3 Government transfers
An agent who does not have enough resources to pay for his medical expenses receives
a transfer from the government in the amount  t: This transfer maintains the agent's
consumption at a minimum level guaranteed by the government cmin.
3.1.4 Portfolio choice
Individuals have two investment options - a risk-free bond with return r and an
annuity - and cannot borrow. Once the annuity is bought, it cannot be sold. The annuity
is modeled in the following way: by paying the amount qtt+1 today, an individual buys
a stream of payments t+1 that he will receive each period, conditional on being alive. I
denote the total annuity income an agent receives at age t by nt.
3.1.5 Optimization problem
Each period an individual decides how to distribute his current wealth between con-
sumption (ct) and investments in bonds (kt+1) and annuities (t+1), given that he
has to pay medical expenses (zt). I denote the set of state variables I; t; nt; kt as Xt,
Xt = (I; t; nt; kt). The recursive formulation of the optimization problem can be repre-
sented in the following form:
V (Xt;mt; t; t) = max
ct;kt+1;t+1
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
u(ct) + st Pr(mt+1 = 0jmt; t; I)Z
;
V (Xt+1; 0; t+1; t+1)dF (t+1; t+1jt)+
st Pr(mt+1 = 1jmt; t; I)R
;
V (Xt+1; 1; t+1; t+1)dF (t+1; t+1jt)+
(1  st)(kt+1)
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
(3)
s.t. the budget constraint:
ct + zt + kt+1 + qtt+1 = kt(1 + r) + nt +  t;
government transfers
 t = min f0; cmin   kt(1 + r)  nt + ztg ;
the annuities evolution equation
nt+1 = t+1 + nt;
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borrowing and annuity illiquidity constraints: kt+1;t+1  0, and initial conditions
k0;m0, and n0 = I.
3.2 Insurance sector
I assume that annuity contracts are non-exclusive: individuals are free to buy an
arbitrary number of contracts from dierent insurance companies. This makes it impos-
sible to condition the contract design on the amount purchased. Contracts are linear,
i.e. price of a unit of coverage does not depend on quantity.4 Thus to purchase  units
of annuity coverage, an individual pays q in premiums.
I assume that insurance rms set a restriction on the minimum amount that can be
invested in annuities equal to . This restriction is motivated by the observation that
annuity sellers do not allow for arbitrary small investments in annuities. For example, two
big annuity distributors, Vanguard and Berkshire-Hathaway, put restrictions of $20,000
and $40,000, respectively, on the minimum premium for a life annuity.5
Another restriction that annuity buyers face is the maximum issue age t . Individuals
older than t cannot buy annuities. This restriction reects the fact that in most states
insurance companies are prohibited from selling annuities to individuals beyond a certain
age (Levy et al., 2005).
To assess the importance of adverse selection I need to evaluate how much it changes
the annuity prices. Adverse selection may arise when insurance rms have less informa-
tion about the mortality of individuals buying annuities than the individuals do. In this
environment, when setting the price insurers take into account the average mortality of
all annuity buyers. This average mortality can be substantially lower than the average
mortality of people who do not buy annuities. Moreover, the more annuities people with
low mortality buy, the higher is the price and the more people with high mortality drop
out of the market. To understand the quantitative importance of this problem, I need to
compare an individual's decisions to buy annuities in two situations: i) when the annuity
price reects his own survival probability; ii) when the annuity price reects the average
survival probability of all annuity buyers.
To do this, I consider two scenarios. Under the rst scenario insurance rms are
allowed to observe all state variables of an individual that are relevant for forecasting his
survival probability. As a result, annuities are individually-priced. I call this setup the
\symmetric information scenario".
In the second scenario insurers know the aggregate distribution of individuals over
states, but they cannot observe any characteristics of an annuity purchaser except age. I
4Pauly (1974) points out that exclusive contracts are hard to implement in a competitive insurance
market making it impossible for insurers to price discriminate over units.
5An alternative modeling strategy would be to restrict minimum premium q. However, imposing
the restriction on minimum premium rather than minimum purchase does not change the results.
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call this setup the \asymmetric information scenario". In this environment all people of
the same age buy annuities at a uniform price that reects the average mortality of the
pool of annuity buyers.6
I assume insurance rms act competitively: they take the price of an annuity qt
as given. Let St+ijt denote the probability that an individual survives till period t + i
conditional on being alive at period t. Expected payout per unit of insurance sold to an
individual of age t can be expressed as follows:
t(
t) = qt(
t)  
T tX
i=1
bSt+ijt(
t)
(1 + r)i
; (4)
where   1 is the administrative load, assumed to be proportional to the total expected
payment for the contract7, 
t is the information available to insurers about an individual
of age t, and bSt+ijt(
t) is the insurers' expectation of the future survival probability of
an individual buying the annuity given all available information 
t. It can be expressed
as follows: bSt+ijt(
t) = Et(St+ijtj
t):
In the symmetric information case, an insurer and an annuity buyer have the same
information. Thus, 
t includes all variables relevant for determining the survival proba-
bility of a person of a given age:

t = (mt; I):
In the asymmetric information case, an insurer does not know anything about an
individual except the age and the fact that he bought an annuity, so:

t = (t+1(k; n;m; I; t; ; )   ):
In this case bSt+ijt represents a rm's belief about the probability that an individual
who buys an annuity will survive until period t + i. In equilibrium, bSt+ijt has to be
consistent with the optimal behavior of individuals.
Firms chooses the amount of annuity to sell (Nt) by solving the following maximization
problem:
max
Nt
Ntt: (5)
6This outcome resembles the current situation in the market for longevity insurance in the U.S. -
annuity prices are usually conditioned only on age and gender.
7An alternative modeling strategy would be to set the load as an additive term. The results are not
sensitive to this modeling assumption as the robustness check in Appendix C illustrates.
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3.3 Competitive equilibrium
Let V denote the state variables of individuals, V = (k; n;m; I; ; ), V 2 V = K N M
I  Z   where K = R+ [ f0g, N = R+ [ f0g ; M = f0; 1g, I = fI1; I2; I3; I4; I5g,
Z = R;  = R: Denote the distribution of individuals of age t over states by  t(V ).
The competitive equilibrium for the asymmetric information case can be dened as
follows.
Denition 1 A competitive equilibrium is:
(i) a set of belief functions
nbSt+ijt; i = 0; ::; T   toT
t=1
(ii) a set of annuity prices fqtgTt=1
(iii) a set of decision rules for households

ct (V ); kt+1(V );t+1(V ); V 2 V
	T
t=1
and for insurance rms fNt gTt=1
such that:
1. Each annuity seller earns zero prot:
Nt t = 0
2. Firms' belief functions are consistent with households' decision rules:
bSt+ijt =
R
V
t+1(V ) 
t
t+i(V )dVR
V
t+1(V ) t(V )dV
(6)
where  tt+i(V ) is the measure of people of age t+ i who bought an annuity in the amount
t+1(V ) at age t. It can be dened recursively in the following way:
 tt+1(V ) = s(m; I; t) t(V )
 tt+i(V ) =
Z
em2M
s(em; I; t+ i  1) tt+i 1(V; em)dem
Here  tt+i 1(V; em) is the distribution of people aged t+ i  1 who bought an annuity
in the amount t+1(V ) at age t across their current health status em: It can be recursively
expressed as follows:
 tt+1(V; em) = Pr(emjm; t; I)s(m; I; t) t(V )
 tt+i(V; em) = Z
m2M
Pr(emjm; t+ i  1; I)s(m; I; t+ i  1) tt+i 1(V;m)dm
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3. Given annuity prices fqtgTt=1, households' decision rules solve optimization problem
(3) and Nt solves equation (5).
4. The market clears
Nt =
Z
V
t+1(V ) t(V )dV:
The denition of the competitive equilibrium for the symmetric information scenario
is similar, with the following modications: the annuity prices now depend on mt and I
and the second condition for the equilibrium takes the form:
bSt+ijt(
t) = Et(St+ijtjmt; It):
4 Data and calibration
4.1 Parameters calibration
The model period is two years. Retirees in the model start their life at age 70 and
live at a maximum to age of 100.
The annual interest rate r is set to 2%. The administrative load  is assumed to
be equal to 10%. This number is based on the study of Mitchell et al. (1999) which
showed that on average, U.S. insurance companies add 10% to the annuity price because
of administrative costs. The maximum issue age is set to be equal to 88 years. In general,
the maximum issue age varies by state and ranges from 80 years old to the mid-90s (Levy
et al, 2005).
The minimum purchase requirement is set to $2,500. This means that in order to
buy an annuity, an individual should be willing to initiate a contract that will bring him
at least $2,500 per year or $208 per month. Given prices produced by the model, this
is equivalent to a minimum initial premium (q) of approximately $28,000 for a 70 year
old and $12,000 for an 88 year old. This is in line with the restrictions on minimum
premiums set by big annuity distributors such as Vanguard and Berkshire-Hathaway.
The parameters governing the evolution of health, survival, and medical expenses
come from papers by DFJ and French and Jones (2004). The persistence parameter
(hc) is set to 0.849. The innovation variance of the persistent component 
2
" is equal
to 0.133 and the innovation variance of the transitory component 2 is 0.524. The sum
of persistent and transitory components is normalized to one.8 The variance of the log
medical expenses 2z is equal to 1.78.
8DFJ's estimates of the stochastic component of medical expenses are based on the results of French
and Jones (2004). The dierence between these two studies is that DFJ uses one year medical expenses
while French and Jones (2010) use two-year averages. Since in my model one period is two years, I use
French and Jones's (2004) estimates and adjust the mean. The corresponding parameters for the one
year process are: hc = 0:922, 
2
" = 0:050, and 
2
 = 0:665.
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For the discount factor , preference parameters ; ; and , and the minimum con-
sumption oor cmin I use structural estimates from the DFJ study. In particular,  is
set to 0.97,  to 3.84, and cmin to $2,665. The strength of the bequest motive  is set
to 2,360 and the shift parameter  to $273,000.9 Table 1 summarizes all the parameter
values.10
Parameter Value
Risk aversion  3.84
Discount factor  0.97
Strength of bequest motive  2,360
Shift parameter  $273,000
Interest rate r 2%
Administrative load  10%
Consumption oor cmin $2,665
Maximum issue age t 88 years
Minimum purchase  $2,500
Persistence hc 0.849
Variance of medical costs 2z 1.78
Variance of transitory shock 2 0.524
Variance of persistent shock 2" 0.133
Table 1: Parameters of the model
4.2 Initial distribution
To calibrate the initial distribution of retirees over the state variables k0; n0;m0 I use
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) dataset. I use the RAND version of all the
variables except for the annuity ownership rates. Individuals in the model start their
retired life at age 70, so I used the cohort aged 65-75 in 1998 (wave 4) to calibrate
the initial distribution.11 The sample used for simulations includes only single retirees.
9The results for several alternative values of the coecients of risk aversion, discount factor and
bequest parameters are reported in Appendices A and B.
10All parameters correspond to annual values except for parameters describing the evolution of stochas-
tic medical expenses.
11The model of this study builds on the DFJ framework, however I cannot use the same cohort as DFJ
for the calibration of the initial distribution. For simulations I need a large sample of people around
age 70 because few people buy annuities. The AHEAD dataset that is used by DFJ includes people
older than age 70. The only wave of AHEAD that has a large sample of people younger than 75 is wave
1 (1993), however this wave has a serious wealth underreporting problem (Rohwedder et al, 2006). I
chose to use the fourth wave of HRS because wave three has some inaccuracy in wealth data (Lockwood,
2012b). All other sample selection criteria are the same as in DFJ.
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All Income quintiles
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Mean
Age 70.4 68.8 70.7 70.6 71.0 70.7
Total wealth 161,311 70,942 78,213 173,047 197,731 287,082
Non-housing wealth 107,047 47,147 41,916 116,132 134,201 196,168
Income 12,964 4,403 7,766 10,667 14,820 23,206
Median
Age 71 68 71 71 72 71
Total wealth 64,000 3,000 22,500 71,000 112,000 176,950
Non-housing wealth 13,000 43 2,300 15,650 44,000 87,200
Income 10,663 4,773 7,802 10,671 14,720 23,725
Percent
Healthy 59.2 39.7 54.2 61.5 66.3 74.3
Own life annuity 5.0 0.4 1.0 5.3 6.4 12.2
Table 2: Sample characteristics
Singles are dened as people who are divorced, never married or widowed and who
reported having no partner. A person is dened as retired if his annual earnings were
below $3,000. The resulting sample size is 1,483. I convert all dollar variables to constant
1998 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Initial wealth (k0) includes the value of housing and real estate, vehicles, value of busi-
ness, IRAs, Keoghs, stocks, bonds, checking, saving and money market accounts, minus
mortgages and other debts. Preexisting annuity holdings (n0) correspond to annuity-like
income that an individual is entitled to receive during his retirement years and it also
proxies permanent income (I). I follow DFJ in dening permanent income (or annuity-
like income) as the sum of Social Security benets, DB pensions, veteran benets, food
stamps, and annuities that individuals receive each year and then take the average over
all years that individuals are observed in the data. Table 2 displays means and medians
for the total and non-housing wealth and income in the sample used for simulations. The
displayed statistics illustrate a substantial heterogeneity across income quintiles. People
in the top quintile receive income that is on average almost ve times higher than peo-
ple in the bottom quintile. The disparity in wealth holdings is even more pronounced.
Median total wealth of retirees in the bottom quintile is only $3,000, while for the top
quintile it is close to $180,000.
Initial health (m0) is dened based on self-reported health. Individuals who report
being in excellent, very good and good health are classied as healthy, while individuals
who report their health being fair and poor are classied as unhealthy. The resulting
fraction of healthy people is reported in the ninth row of Table 2. Overall, most people
report being healthy. However, there is substantial heterogeneity by income quintiles.
The fraction of healthy people in the top income quintile (74%) is almost twice the
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fraction of healthy people in the bottom quintile (38%).
When constructing annuity ownership rates for my sample, I dene a person as having
life annuity if the following two conditions hold. First, he answers 'yes' to the question
of whether he receives income from an annuity other than pensions or Social Security.
Second, he reports that at least one of his two largest private annuities continues for life.
The resulting annuity ownership rates are shown in the last row of Table 2. Overall, only
5% of people own life annuities.12 There is a substantial heterogeneity in annuity market
participation rates by income quintiles. While almost no retirees in the bottom quintile
own annuities, in the top quintile the annuity ownership rate exceeds 12%.
5 Results
This section describes the model predictions about the annuity market participation
rates and compares them to the data. To evaluate the combined eect of all factors
behind non-annuitization I consider two versions of the model: the model that has no
impediments to annutization (hereafter called the simple model), and the model with
all seven impediments to annuitization (hereafter called the full model). The full model
is as described in Section 3 (with asymmetric information equilibrium) while the simple
model represents its stripped-down version where all features that can negatively aect
the annuity demand are assumed away.
To evaluate the relative quantitative importance of dierent factors behind non-
annuitization, I consider two sets of experiments. I start with the full model and remove
impediments for annuitization one at a time, keeping all other model features constant.
I then compare the annuity market participation rates between the full model and the
model where one impediment to annuitization is missing. In the next set of experiments,
I start with the simple model and I add dierent impediments to annuitization one at a
time. Then I compare the annuity market participation rates between the simple model
and the model where only one impediment to annuitization is present.
The experiments that switch on/o dierent factors aecting the annuity demand are
designed in the following way.
Adverse selection. The model without adverse selection assumes symmetric informa-
tion equilibrium in the annuity market , i.e. retirees face individually priced annuities.
The model with adverse selection assumes asymmetric information equilibrium, i.e. there
is only one pooling price for each age.13
12The percentage of people who own both life and period-certain annuities constitutes 7.3%.
13It is important to note that in the model without medical expenses the equilibrium in the annuity
market is not unique. This happens because, as will be shown later, in the absence of medical expenses
most people buy annuities only once in the rst period. However, there may exist a group of people that
buy annuities several times and the timing of their second purchase depends on the equilibrium prices
for ages above 70. To be consistent in comparisons, when considering versions of the model without
13
Consumption oor. The consumption oor cmin estimated by DFJ ($2,665) is on
the low side of what is commonly used in the literature (see Kitao and Jeske, 2009 and
Kopecky and Koreshkova, 2011). In the model with high consumption oor this number
is raised to $6,000.
Illiquid housing. In the model with illiquid housing initial wealth k0 is redened as
total wealth minus housing wealth.14
Preannuitized wealth. In the model with preannuitized wealth retirees receive annuity-
like income n0 from Social Security and DB plans as observed in the data. In the model
without preannuitized wealth it is assumed that all annuity-like income is converted to
liquid wealth. This conversion is done by assuming that individuals sell all annuity-like
income they are entitled to receive at market prices for the case of symmetric information
equilibrium.15
Minimum purchase requirements, medical expenses, and bequest motives. In the model
without minimum purchase requirement  is set to zero, i.e. people can buy any amount
of annuities. In the model without medical expenses zt = 0 for all t. In the model without
bequest motives the strength of bequest  is set to zero.
5.1 Combined eect of all the impediments to annuitization
Table 3 compares annuity market participation rates for people at age 70 for the data,
the simple model and the full model.16 The simple model predicts that almost 97% of
people buy annuities. Those few people who do not participate in the annuity market
come from the bottom income quintile: in this quintile 82.8% of people buy annuities,
while in all other quintiles the participation rate is 100%. The non-participating indi-
viduals are those who start retirement with almost zero wealth and who rely mostly on
government means-tested transfers.
The full model goes a long way towards decreasing the annuity demand: once all
potential explanations for the annuity puzzle are included, the participation rate drops
from 97% to around 20%.17 However, it still remains higher than in the data (5%).
medical expenses I only focus on equilibriums where people buy annuities only once in the rst period.
This does not aect the main results because the group that chooses to buy additional annuities later is
very small.
14Ideally, one would want to allow people to adjust their housing wealth inside the model. However,
this involves adding another state variable which makes the model computationally intractable. To get
some idea of the importance of housing wealth, I compare two extreme assumptions: i)housing has the
same liquidity as other types of wealth, ii) housing is absolutely illiquid.
15If I assume individuals sell preexisting annuities at prices observed under equilibrium with asym-
metric information the resulting amount of liquid wealth will dier from one experiment to another due
to the changing prices.
16I show the participation rates only at age 70 because, as shown later, people start buying annuities
in the rst period of retirement and in most cases they do it once.
17The equilibrium annuity prices produced by the full model are reported in Appendix D.
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Income quintile Data No impediments All impediments
to annuitization to annuitization
All 5.0 96.6 20.3
1 0.4 82.8 7.0
2 1.0 100.0 14.6
3 5.3 100.0 26.2
4 6.4 100.0 30.7
5 12.2 100.0 23.2
Table 3: Participation in the annuity market: data, model with no impediments to an-
nuitization, and model with all impediments to annuitization
Section 5.4 discusses what changes in the benchmark calibration can move the model
closer to the data.
5.2 Relative importance of dierent impediments to annuitiza-
tion
5.2.1 Analyzing the full model
The top panel of Table 4 shows how much annuity market participation rates change
when only one impediment to annutization is removed from the full model. The most
quantitatively important factor is preannuitized wealth. Elimination of this factor in-
creases the annuity ownership rate more than twofold. If there is no preannuitized
wealth around 42% of retirees will buy annuities even if all other impediments to an-
nuitization are present. The next three most important factors are illiquid housing,
minimum purchase requirement and bequest motives: without each of these factors the
annuity ownership rates will be more than 35%. It is important to note that illiquidity of
housing, preannuitized wealth and minimum purchase requirement act through a similar
mechanism: they decrease the possibilities for annuitization. Annuities pay out for a long
period of time and thus involve big upfront investments. Minimum purchase requirement
increases these upfront costs, and illiquidity of housing and preannuitized wealth decrease
the amount of wealth available for annuitization. This suggests that disposable wealth is
an important factor aecting the demand for annuities, especially if there is a restriction
on the minimum amount that can be invested.18
There is some heterogeneity in terms of how dierent impediments to annuitization
aect people in dierent income quintiles. For the two bottom quintiles, illiquidity of
18Inkman et al (2011) also nd that wealth is a quantitatively important factor aecting households'
annuity demand.
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Income Full No adv. No med. Low cmin No Liquid No min. No preann
quintile model selection expense bequest housing purchase wealth
All 20.3 19.9 23.6 27.2 36.3 39.0 35.8 42.0
1 7.0 10.5 10.1 8.8 8.1 18.7 12.1 3.9
2 14.6 20.6 20.9 15.8 17.4 32.7 29.3 6.9
3 26.2 33.7 32.9 29.9 34.8 50.3 48.5 29.0
4 30.7 30.1 33.3 43.6 53.5 55.0 51.5 75.7
5 23.2 5.0 20.9 38.1 67.7 38.5 37.8 94.7
Income Simple + adv. + med. High cmin + Illiquid + min. + preann
quintile model selection expense bequest housing purchase wealth
All 96.9 92.2 92.8 84.1 96.6 95.7 95.1 83.5
1 82.8 60.9 65.5 32.9 82.8 78.5 75.8 59.6
2 100.0 100.0 98.7 88.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 77.4
3 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 89.8
4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.9
5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 94.6
Table 4: Annuity market participation rates for the modications of the full model (top
panel) and the simple model (bottom panel)
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housing wealth has the largest quantitative impact on the fraction of annuity market
participants. The removal of preannuitized wealth, however, decreases their demand for
annuities. When Social Security and DB pension income is converted to liquid wealth,
the annuity ownership rate for the bottom income quintile goes down from 7.2% to 3.9%.
This happens because of the interaction of preannuitized wealth and a high consumption
oor which will be discussed later when analyzing the simple model. For the top income
quintile, the two most important factors aecting the annuity demand are preannuitized
wealth and bequest motives. This happens because people in this group hold a large
amount of preannuitized wealth and its transformation into liquid wealth has a large
impact on resources available for annuitization. As for bequests, these are luxury goods
and this strongly aects people in the top income quintile because they have higher
wealth (see Table 2). Note that no other income quintile is aected by bequest motives
to such an extent as the fth quintile.
Another important observation from the top panel of Table 4 is that the removal
of adverse selection from the full model has almost no impact on the overall annuity
ownership rate. However, this hides a substantial heterogeneity in how this factor aects
people in dierent income quintiles. In the absence of adverse selection there is a drop in
the annuity market participation rate from the top two income quintiles and an increase
in the participation from the bottom three quintiles.
The heterogeneous eect of adverse selection arises because the survival probability
is positively correlated with income. In the asymmetric information equilibrium when
annuities are priced only based on age, people in high income quintiles (and low survival
probabilities) enjoy annuity prices that are lower than they would face if their survival
probability was observed. In other words, higher income quintiles get an implicit subsidy
from low income quintiles. Table 5 provides a quantitative assessment of this subsidy. For
people in the lowest income quintile and in bad health, the pooling equilibrium price is
around 57% higher than the price they face if insurance rms observe their mortality. At
the other extreme, people in the highest income quintile and in good health pay almost
12% less for annuities than in the symmetric information equilibrium.
Note that the removal of medical expenses has a small eect on the overall annuity
ownership rates. Without medical expenses the demand for annuities from the bottom
and middle income quintiles goes up, while it decreases for the top quintile. The eect of
medical expenses will be discussed in more detail later when I analyze the simple model.
5.2.2 Analyzing the simple model
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows annuity market participation rates when the
simple model features only one impediment to annuitization. It is evident that only one
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Income quintile Bad health Good health
1 56.5 21.1
2 40.7 11.2
3 26.5 2.5
4 13.9 -5.1
5 3.2 -11.7
Table 5: Percentage change in price in the pooling equilibrium comparing to the sym-
metric information equilibrium
impediment to annuitization has little power in decreasing annuity ownership rates: when
the life-cycle model features only one factor that can potentially decrease the annuity
demand the participation rate is always above 80%. This suggests that to explain low
demand for annuities it is important to take into account the interaction between dierent
factors behind non-annuitization.
Two factors have the largest quantitative impact in the simple model: preannuitized
wealth and the consumption minimum oor. Both factors decrease the demand for
annuities from 97% to around 84%. However, the mechanism behind the eect of these
two factors is dierent. Preannuitized wealth substantially decreases annuity market
participation rates because many people have almost no nancial resources except for
Social Security and DB income. Table 6 illustrates this further by showing the share of
annuity income in total amount of available resources
n0
k0 + n0
separately for people who
bought annuities and those who did not in the simple model with preannuitized wealth.
Those retirees who decide not to invest in annuities have few resources except for annuity
income: the percentage of annuity income in total available funds is more than 90%. For
people who chose to invest in annuities this percentage is much lower: it does not exceed
40%.
Quintile Retirees who Retirees who
bought annuity didn't buy annuity
1 32.5 93.5
2 37.7 99.7
3 27.0 98.6
4 25.3 99.6
5 26.2 98.5
Table 6: Average shares of annuity-like income in available resources
As for the consumption minimum oor, it provides public annuity-like income for
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people who outlive their assets. In the presence of preannuitized wealth most people
have pension income that exceeds the consumption oor. Once preannuitized wealth is
converted to liquid wealth, people may use this opportunity to consume out of this liquid
wealth and then rely on the consumption oor as opposed to buying private annuities.
This strategy becomes more attractive as the consumption oor increases. In other
words, when the consumption oor is high and there is no preannuitized wealth, low-
income people have less incentives to buy annuities. This explains why the removal of
preannuitized wealth from the full model decreases the demand for annuities from the
lowest income quintiles as shown in the top panel of Table 4. This result also emphasizes
the importance of taking into account the interaction between government means-tested
transfers and preannuitized wealth when considering the consequences of the transition
from Dened Benets to Dened Contribution pension plans or possible privatization of
Social Security.
Another important observation from the second panel of Table 4 is that except for
preannuitized wealth, no other factor can aect all income quintiles. In the top two
income quintiles everyone buys annuities regardless of what impediments to annuitization
are present.
5.2.3 Sequential analysis
In the next set of experiments I cumulatively add to the simple model the four imped-
iments to annuitization that turned out to be the most quantitatively important in the
full model. The rst panel of Table 7 considers the quantitative implications of adding
one impediment to annuitization to the simple model that already features preannuitized
wealth.
In this setup the impact of dierent factors becomes more pronounced. The two most
important factors are now the minimum purchase requirement and bequest motives: each
of these factors decreases the participation rate from around 84% to less than 66%. An-
other important observation is that bequest motive introduces strong non-monotonicity
in the relationship between the annuity market participation rate and income quintile.
For example, in the presence of bequest motives only around 26% of people in the top
income quintile buy annuities while among the third quintile the participation rate is
around 82%. This goes in sharp contrast with the data, where the relationship between
annuity ownership rates and income is strongly monotone (see the rst column of Table
3). Notice also that in the model where retirees have preannuitized wealth the consump-
tion oor has much less impact on the annuity market participation rate. This happens
because most retirees have pension income which is above the consumption oor and
thus this safety net does not impact their decisions to annuitize.
The second panel of Table 7 illustrates the relative quantitative importance of dier-
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Simple model+preann wealth
Income Simple + adv. + med. High cmin + Illiquid + min.
quintile model selection expense bequest housing purchase
All 83.5 78.5 80.8 81.0 65.2 72.6 65.8
1 59.6 49.5 58.2 47.5 58.6 39.7 37.4
2 77.4 66.3 72.0 77.4 72.4 66.3 48.1
3 89.8 86.8 86.2 89.8 87.5 82.4 72.2
4 95.9 94.9 93.5 95.9 81.5 85.2 85.2
5 94.6 95.2 94.2 94.6 26.3 89.5 86.4
Simple model+preann wealth+min purchase
All 65.8 64.1 61.3 65.0 40.3 40.1 -
1 37.4 33.3 35.0 33.3 37.4 13.5 -
2 48.1 43.1 43.3 48.1 47.8 23.9 -
3 72.2 71.9 65.8 72.2 72.2 38.6 -
4 85.2 84.5 77.7 85.2 40.7 59.3 -
5 86.4 87.8 84.8 86.4 3.4 65.2 -
Simple model+preann wealth+min purchase+illiquid housing
All 40.1 39.5 36.7 39.8 19.8 - -
1 13.5 12.1 12.4 12.1 13.5 - -
2 23.9 21.5 21.1 23.9 23.2 - -
3 38.6 37.9 35.8 38.6 38.6 - -
4 59.3 58.2 49.8 59.3 21.5 - -
5 65.2 67.9 64.6 65.2 2.4 - -
Simple model+preann wealth+min purchase+illiquid houisng+bequest
All 19.8 24.4 23.6 19.6 - - -
1 13.5 12.1 12.4 12.1 - - -
2 23.2 20.9 20.3 23.6 - - -
3 38.6 32.9 33.6 38.6 - - -
4 21.5 33.3 39.1 21.5 - - -
5 2.4 22.9 12.9 2.4 - - -
Table 7: Annuity market participation rates: sequential analysis of the simple model.
Each panel considers adding one impediment to annuitization at a time to dif-
ferent versions of the simple model
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ent impediments to annuitization in the simple model that already features preannuitized
wealth and minimum purchase requirement. In this setup the strongest impact is pro-
duced by illiquidity of housing wealth and bequest motives. In total, the combination of
minimum purchase requirement, preannuitized wealth and one of these two factors can
decrease the annuity ownership rates to 40%. This version of the model also highlights
the interaction between the illiquidity of housing wealth and minimum annuity purchase
requirement. When people face no restrictions on how much they can invest in annuities,
the illiquidity of housing wealth has a moderate impact on the annuity demand (see the
rst panel of Table 7). However, once minimum purchase restriction is introduced, the
illiquidity of housing wealth reinforces this constraint and substantially decreases the
demand for annuities.
The third panel of Table 7 repeats the analysis for the model that already features
illiquid housing, preannuitized wealth and minimum annuity purchase requirement. Con-
sistent with the previous results, in this environment bequest motives stand out as the
most important impediment to annuitization. In total the combination of bequest mo-
tives, illiquid housing, preannuitized wealth and minimum annuity purchase requirement
can reduce the demand for annuities to around 20%, which is the same as in the full
model. However, as in the previous set of experiments, bequest motives result in non-
monotone relationship between annuity ownership and income.
The last panel of Table 7 shows how adding adverse selection, medical expenses and
increasing the consumption oor changes the demand for annuities in the model that
already features bequest motives, minimum purchase requirement, illiquidity of housing
and preannuitized wealth. In general, adding additional factors to the model that already
features the four most powerful impediments to annuitization cannot decrease the annuity
demand any further.
The sequential analysis illustrates that the eect of medical expenses changes de-
pending on what other features are present in the model. In the versions of the simple
model without bequest motives (panel 1-3 of Table 7) adding medical expenses decreases
annuity ownership rates in each income quintile. However, when medical expenses are
added to the simple model with bequest motives the annuity ownership rate increases
and this is driven by the top two income quintiles. In general, in the presence of uncertain
medical expenses people increasingly use liquid wealth to insure against medical shocks.
However, in the presence of a bequest motive this liquid wealth has an additional value
of being bequeathable. People with a strong bequest motive want to avoid the situation
of surviving until old age and having their wealth depleted by a sequence of bad medical
shocks, so they use annuities to insure against such an event. Thus, annuities are used
not only to insure old age consumption but also liquid wealth at old ages.
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5.3 Life-cycle pattern of annuity purchase
Figure (1) illustrates how age proles of annuity purchases are aected by dierent
impediments to annuitization. To highlight the importance of dierent factors the exper-
iments are performed for the simple life-cycle model with preannuitized wealth.19 The
patterns of annuity purchase are simulated for individuals who initially are in good health
and who were given the initial wealth and annuity income that correspond to the median
values of the initial distribution for each permanent income quintile.20
In most experiments people buy annuities only once in the rst period. It can be
shown (see Appendix G) that, under certain conditions, the one-time purchase of annu-
ities in the rst period can be a general result. The conditions under which this result
holds include the following:
1) There is no uncertainty except the time of death
2) Medical expenditures are zero
3) (1 + r) < 1
4) n0 > cmin.
The last condition ensures that an individual is already guaranteed income that ex-
ceeds the minimum consumption oor.21
The intuition behind this theoretical result is as follows. There are two ways to nance
an annuity purchase: using nancial wealth or existing annuity income. The second way
would imply an increasing consumption prole, which is not optimal given (1 + r) < 1.
Thus, if an individual buys an annuity, he will use his nancial wealth; if an individual
waits to buy annuities, he has to save in bonds. But this strategy is dominated by buying
annuities from the start, because over the long-run an annuity brings a higher return.
The most noticeable changes in the life-cycle pattern of annuity purchase are intro-
duced by medical expenses. People still buy annuities at the beginning of retirement but
they also increase annuity holdings towards the end of life. This happens since retirees
now have to nance not only their consumption but also medical expenditures that are
increasing steeply over time. In this case, retirees use their annuity income to buy more
annuities.
The bottom right graph in Figure (1) shows the life-cycle annuity purchase prole
19The graphs look very similar for the case when there is no preannuitized wealth but the amount of
annuity purchased is larger and the eect of each factor is less pronounced. On average, in the absence
of preannuitized wealth people buy twice as much annuity income.
20The graphs for individuals who start retirement in bad health are omitted because the patterns look
the same except for the dierence in the magnitude of purchase.
21This theoretical result illustrates the intuition behind the life-cycle proles of annuity purchase. It
is important to point out that the assumption 1) does not hold in the simple model because health is
uncertain and thus future survival probabilities are uncertain as well. The deterioration in health in the
equilibrium with symmetric information decreases the price of annuities and this can lead to additional
annuity purchases. However, few people engage in additional purchase of annuities that is why it does
not have an eect on annuity purchase proles for most retirees except those in the bottom quintile.
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Figure 1: The eect of dierent factors on the annuity purchases for a retiree with median wealth and
in good initial health
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for the full model, i.e. the model with all the impediments to annuitization. Adding
all other impediments to annuitization eliminates the pattern of increasing annuity pur-
chases produced by medical expenses. In other words, medical expenses make it optimal
for people to build up their income by annuitizing out of existing annuities, but other
impediments to annuitization almost eliminate the demand for annuities for ages above
70.
5.4 Can the annuity market participation rate be decreased
further?
As Table 3 illustrates, even the full model with all the impediments to annuitization
overpredicts annuity ownership rates comparing to the data. This section discusses in
what directions the model can be modied in order to produce lower annuity demand.
The quantitative analysis above indicates that disposable wealth is one of the most
important factors in determining the demand for annuities, especially when combined
with minimum annuity purchase requirement. To understand whether these two factors
are powerful enough to reduce the demand for annuities close to the level that we observe
in the data, I introduce two modications to the full model. First, I redene the initial
wealth k0 by excluding from the total non-housing wealth the value of cars and businesses.
The motivation for this exercise is that given the special properties of these two types
of assets it may be possible that retirees do not consider them as a potential target for
annuitization. Second, I increase the minimum purchase requirement twice - from $2,500
to $5,000 annual annuity income. The results of this modied full model are reported in
Table 8 alongside the data and the results from the original full model.
Income quintile Data Full model Modied
full model
All 5.0 20.3 7.5
1 0.4 7.0 2.3
2 1.0 14.6 4.8
3 5.3 26.2 9.5
4 6.4 30.7 12.2
5 12.2 23.2 8.8
Table 8: Participation in the annuity market: data, full model and modied full model
Comparing to the full model annuity ownership rates go down by more than half: from
20% to less than 8%. This suggests that an important direction in the future exploration
of the annuity puzzle is to better understand the properties of the dierent types of assets
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that retirees own. If people consider all their assets equally suitable for annuitization,
then it is hard to justify the observed low annuity demand. However, if people prefer not
to annuitize their less liquid wealth then the standard life-cycle model augmented with
high minimum purchase requirement and other impediments to annuitization can come
close to accounting for low demand for annuities.
6 Conclusion
This study considers dierent explanations for the annuity puzzle in a quantitative
heterogeneous agent model with equilibrium in the annuity market. It shows that in the
absence of any impediments to annuitization all but the poorest retirees buy annuities.
The life-cycle model that incorporates all impediments to annuitization decreases the de-
mand for annuities almost ve times. The most quantitatively important impediments to
annuitization are preannuitized wealth, illiquid housing, minimum purchase requirement
and bequest motives. Adverse selection noticeably decreases the demand for annuities
amongst people in the bottom income quintiles but increases the demand from the top
quintiles, thus producing a small overall eect. Medical expenses have a small eect
on annuity ownership rates but they can substantially change the life cycle pattern of
annuity purchases.
In general, retirees are willing to buy annuities but the amount of annuities they
are actually buying is small. Annuities bring returns for many years and the upfront
investment, even when buying a small stream of annuity income, is large. When insurance
rms restrict the minimum amount an individual can invest in annuities this substantially
decreases the number of retirees in the market, especially if housing wealth is illiquid and
part of wealth is preannuitized. Increasing minimum purchase requirement to $5,000
and restricting people from annuitizing their businesses and cars can bring the annuity
ownership rates close to the data. This suggests the importance of better understanding
of how easily dierent components of retirees' wealth can be annuitized in future studies
of the annuity puzzle.
25
A Alternative specications of bequest motives
To understand how sensitive the demand for annuities to dierence in bequest motives
is, I use several alternative bequest specications from the following studies: De Nardi
(2004), Lockwood (2012b), Ameriks et al (2012) and Nakajima and Telyukova (2011).
Bequest specications for each of these studies are shown in Table 9 alongside with DFJ's
bequest specication that is used in the benchmark calibration (in Table 9 I keep the
notation as in the original studies).
Bequest form Parameter values
De Nardi et al. (2010) 
(k + b)1 
1    = 2; 360; k = 273; 000;  = 3:84
De Nardi (2004) 1(1 +
b
2
)1  1 =  9:5; 2 = 11:6;  = 1:5
Lockwood (2012b)


1  
 ( 
1  cb + b)
1 
1    = 0:919; cb = 20; 416;  = 3
Ameriks et al. (2011)
$
1   (+
b
$
)1  $ = 47:6;  = 7; 280;  = 3
Nakajima et al. (2011) 
( + b)1 
1    = 3:77;  = 9; 675;  = 2:68
Table 9: Bequest motives in various studies. Notation is the same as used by the authors,
b denotes the amount of wealth bequeathed
The parameterizations of bequest motives specied in Table 9 are not directly com-
parable because each of these studies uses a dierent coecient of risk-aversion and
normalizes nominal variables to a dierent base year. To compare these bequest motives
in the unied framework I use the following approach. First, I consider a simple one-
period consumption-saving model augmented with a bequest motive. Assume an agent
has wealth K. Tomorrow an agent dies with probability 1 and he can leave a bequest in
the amount b. His consumption today will be K   b. The optimization problem looks as
follows:
max
b
f(K   b)
1 
1   + v(b)g (7)
The solution to this problem produces two outcomes: i) the threshold value of wealth
above which a bequest motive becomes operational (K), i.e. people with wealth below
the threshold will not leave a bequest22; ii) marginal propensity to bequeath (MPB), i.e.
the fraction of each additional dollar of wealth that will be bequeathed once bequest is
operational. This can be dened as
@b
@K
where b is a solution to problem (7).
22K can be dened as follows: K = (v0(0))
 
1

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Next, I compute the threshold and MPB implied by each bequest specication in Table
9. Both K and
@b
@K
are inuenced not only by the parameters of bequest functions but
also by the risk aversion. In addition, the threshold values are nominal variables and
thus depend on the base year used in each study. I convert them to one base year which
is the same as used in my study. The resulting values for MPBs and for threshold values
can be compared across studies and they are reported in the rst two columns of Table
10. Note that the bequest motives under consideration cover a wide spectrum of possible
bequest preferences. The least strong bequest motives (Nakajima and Telyukova, 2011)
have MPB equal to 0.62, while the strongest bequest motives (Ameriks et al, 2011) have
MPB equal to 0.98, which is equivalent to a linear bequest motive since almost the entire
marginal wealth above the threshold is bequeathed. In terms of being luxury goods, the
highest threshold among all specications is $64,078 (De Nardi, 2004) while the lowest
are $6,063 and $6,093 (Ameriks et al, 2011 and Nakajima and Telyukova, 2011). In other
words, the form of De Nardi (2004) implies that bequests are luxury goods to a much
larger extent than the forms of Ameriks et al (2011) and Nakajima and Telyukova (2011).
K (in 1998$)
@b
@K
 
De Nardi et al. (2010) 36; 124 0:88 2,360 273,000
De Nardi (2004) 64; 708 0:86 1,244 413,911
Lockwood (2012b) 15; 265 0:92 11,832 175,552
Ameriks et al. (2011) 6; 063 0:98 2,767,009 288,597
Nakajima et al. (2011) 6; 093 0:62 6.7 9,998
Table 10: Bequest motives in various studies: unied framework
As a next step I need to nd bequest parameters  and  that can produce the
same thresholds and MPBs as listed in Table 10 when plugged into the bequest function
(kt) = 
(+ kt)
1 
1   together with the risk aversion used in my benchmark calibration.
The resulting values of  and  are shown in the last two columns of Table 10. Next I
solve four versions of the full model with these parameters of the bequest function. The
results are shown in Table 11.
One can see that bequest specications with MPB greater than 0.9 can completely
eliminate annuity demand when all other impediments to annuitization are present: be-
quest motives specied in Ameriks et al (2012) and Lockwood (2012b) result in zero
annuity ownership rates. The bequest parametrization of De Nardi (2004) has almost
no eect on the demand for annuities. The full model with bequest motives as in De
Nardi (2004) produces almost the same annuity ownership rate as the full model without
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Income quintile DFJ De Nardi Lockwood Ameriks Nakajima
(2010) (2004) (2012b) (2009) (2011)
All 20.3 34.8 0.0 0.0 25.8
1 7.0 7.9 0.0 0.0 8.1
2 14.6 17.4 0.0 0.0 11.3
3 26.2 34.2 0.0 0.0 27.4
4 30.7 53.4 0.0 0.0 35.6
5 23.2 61.3 0.0 0.0 46.6
Table 11: Annuity market participation rates for the full model with dierent parame-
terizations of bequest motives.
bequest motives (see the top panel of Table 4). Even though the MPB in the bequest
specication of De Nardi (2004) is almost the same as the MPB used in my benchmark
calibration, the former bequest motives have a higher threshold and thus aect fewer peo-
ple. Another important observation is that the bequest parametrization of Nakajima and
Telyukova (2011) can reproduce the monotone relationship between annuity ownership
and income.
As a nal exercise I consider if it is possible to reduce overall annuity demand while
keeping the monotone relationship between income quintile and annuity ownership rate.
To do this I increase the strength of the bequest motive specied by Nakajima and
Telyukova (2011) since it is the only bequest motive that can produce this monotone
relationship due to its low threshold. Table 12 displays the results of the full model that
has bequest motives with the same threshold as in Nakajima and Telyukova (2011) but
with higher MPB. In particular, I increase MPB to 0.7, 0.8 and 0.88 (the last MPB is
the same as in the benchmark calibration). The results show that increasing the strength
of a bequest motive has a noticeable eect on annuity ownership rates, but once MPB
exceeds 0.8 the monotone relationship between annuity ownership and income disappears.
This suggests that only bequest specication where both MPB and threshold are small
(bequest is much less of a luxury good) is consistent with the empirical fact that annuity
ownership rates are positively correlated with income. Bequest motives with high MPB
can account for low overall annuity demand but they cannot explain why high-income
people have the highest demand for annuities.
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Income quintile MPB=0.62 MPB=0.7 MPB=0.8 MPB=0.88
(original) (as in DFJ)
All 25.8 22.3 13.9 0.8
1 8.1 7.1 5.6 0.3
2 11.3 9.5 6.0 0.0
3 27.4 23.5 17.2 0.8
4 35.6 30.8 20.7 2.0
5 46.6 40.6 20.4 0.8
Table 12: Annuity market participation rates for the bequest parametrization of Naka-
jima and Telyukova (2011) with higher MPB
B Alternative specication of other preference pa-
rameters
This section checks the sensitivity of results to changes in two parameters: discount
factor () and risk aversion (). The rst two columns of Table 13 display participation
rates in the annuity market for the full model when  is rst raised to 0.98 and then
decreased to 0.90. Note that in the rst experiment  was increased to the point when
(1 + r) = 1.
Income quintile Full model  = 0:98  = 0:90  = 3  = 6
All 20.3 20.9 7.1 13.9 27.6
1 7.0 6.7 4.5 4.2 7.9
2 14.6 13.9 6.0 9.7 17.2
3 26.2 26.7 14.5 20.4 32.9
4 30.7 33.1 7.5 22.5 43.7
5 23.2 24.0 3.0 12.6 36.1
Table 13: The sensitivity of annuity ownership rates to changes in the discount factor
and the risk aversion
A decrease in the discount factor decreases annuity market participation rates while
an increase in the discount factor has almost no eect. Impatient individuals save less
and so they are less interested in annuities: when the discount factor goes down to 0.90,
the participation rate drops more than twofold.
In the next experiment the risk aversion in the full model was rst decreased to 3
and then raised to 5. The last two columns of Table 13 display the results of these
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experiments. When the risk aversion decreases, agents want to save less and thus they
buy less annuities.23 An increase in the risk aversion has the opposite eect, thus higher
risk aversion makes the annuity puzzle harder to explain.
C Alternative specications for the administrative
loads
When modeling the annuity market I made the assumption that the administrative
load is proportional to the amount of insurance sold. This section shows how this as-
sumption can aect the results. To do this I consider an alternative specication for
the administrative costs by assuming they do not depend on the total value of insurance
contract but represent xed additive costs. In this case equation (4) can be rewritten as
follows:
t(
t) = qt(
t) 
T tX
i=1
bSt+ijt(
t)
(1 + r)i
  e (8)
where e is lump sum administrative costs.
To be consistent with the results of Mitchell et al (1999) I set e so that the fraction of
administrative costs in the total value of the contract is equal to 10% for people of age 70.
The results of the full model with this alternative specication of administrative costs
is reported in Table 14. Comparing to the full model with proportional administrative
costs, annuity ownership rates are very similar.
Income quintile Full model Additive load
All 20.3 19.7
1 7.0 6.9
2 14.6 13.9
3 26.2 26.2
4 30.7 29.8
5 23.2 21.8
Table 14: The sensitivity of annuity ownership rates to the dierent specication of ad-
ministrative loads
23Inkman et al (2011) also nd that lower risk aversion can substantially decrease the demand for
annuities.
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D Equilibrium annuity prices
This section compares prices produced by the full model with the prices observed in
the data. Figure 2 shows that prices in the model line up well with what we see in the
data24, though for most ages the model underpredicts the real prices.
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Figure 2: Prices in the full model and in the data
There are at least three explanations for this downward bias of the prices in the
model. First, the model considers only single individuals, while real prices are based on
the aggregate statistics that include couples. Second, the HRS dataset underrepresents
wealthy individuals. Given that wealth is negatively correlated with mortality and that
rich individuals tend to buy more annuities, the lack of wealthy individuals in the model
biases the prices downwards. Third, this paper makes an assumption that insurance
rms are perfectly competitive and sets administrative load to 10%. It may be that the
markup insurance rms set is more than 10% due to higher administrative expenses or
violation of the perfect competition assumption.
E Annuitization levels
This section discusses how dierent factors aect the optimal level of annuitization.
Table 15 shows the median fractions of liquid wealth annuitized by retirees in the sim-
ple model that features preannuitized wealth. When there is no other impediment to
annuitization except Social Security and DB plans, median annuitization level is 60%
for retirees in the bottom quintile and around 82% for the top income quintile. Most
24The observed price corresponds to the price of a lifetime annuity with xed income payment with
ination adjustment. The quotes were obtained from Vanguard at www.aigretirementgold.com in 2009.
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impediments strongly aect people in the bottom quintile. Medical expenses decrease
their median annuitization level to less than 10%, while in the presence of adverse selec-
tion, high consumption oor, illiquidity of housing and minimum purchase requirement
median annuitization level of this group becomes zero. For the top income quintile the
strongest impact is produced by bequest motives, which result in zero annuitization level.
Illiquidity of housing and minimum purchase requirement have very small negative im-
pact on the optimal annuitization level for this group. Medical expenses and adverse
selection actually increase the fraction of wealth annuitized in the top income quintile.
Income Simple + adv. + med. High cmin + Illiquid + min.
quintile model selection expense bequest housing purchase
1 59.3 0.0 9.7 0.0 39.2 0.0 0.0
2 76.6 66.1 51.5 76.1 50.7 46.4 0.0
3 80.0 79.5 75.4 80.0 36.8 74.1 79.8
4 81.5 82.5 81.8 81.0 14.8 78.9 81.2
5 81.9 83.9 87.3 81.9 0.0 79.1 78.5
Table 15: Median fraction of liquid wealth annuitized in the simple model with preannu-
itized wealth
F Welfare
Another dimension to consider is how each impediment to annuitization changes
people's valuation of annuities. Table 16 illustrates the welfare gains of people from
having access to the annuity market. Welfare gains are measured as the consumption
equivalent variation (CEV). This represents the percentage of the annual consumption
that a retiree who does not have access to the annuity market is willing to give up in
order to get an option to buy annuities. The results are presented for the simple model
with preannuitized wealth. Overall, if there are no impediments to annuitization except
for Social Security and DB plans, gaining access to the annuity market is equivalent to
increasing consumption by 2% each period. People in high income quintiles gain more
than people in low quintiles since they have more wealth to invest in annuities and hence
can change their consumption patterns in a more signicant way when the annuity market
is available.
Adding impediments to annuitization in most cases decreases the value of the annu-
ity market for retirees. The most noticeable decline in CEV (to 0.7%) happens when
housing wealth is illiquid, emphasizing the importance of disposable wealth for annuity
valuation. Another factor that has a noticeable overall eect is adverse selection, which
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Income Only prean + adv. + med. High cmin + Illiquid + min.
quintile wealth selection expense bequest housing purchase
All 2.0 1.1 1.6 2.5 1.6 0.7 1.7
1 1.7 0.8 1.1 1.8 1.6 0.5 1.4
2 2.8 1.7 1.7 2.8 1.8 1.2 2.4
3 4.8 3.9 3.8 4.8 1.6 2.1 4.6
4 5.8 6.0 6.7 5.7 0.4 2.5 5.6
5 4.5 6.1 8.6 4.6 0.0 2.3 4.4
Table 16: Consumption equivalent variation for the simple model with dierent impedi-
ments to annuitization
decreases the CEV from 2.0% to 1.1%. The eect of adverse selection on the annuity
valuation is positive for people in high income quintiles and negative for people in low
income quintiles, and the latter eect dominates. Similar eects are produced by medical
expenses: the CEV for high-income groups goes up while for low-income groups it goes
down. People in high quintiles value annuities more since they can use them to insure
against uncertain medical expenses. For low income quintiles medical expenses substan-
tially increase the risk of falling under the consumption minimum oor, and in this state
annuities do not have any value.
Another factor that has a heterogeneous eect on dierent income quintiles is bequest
motives, which have almost no eect on the bottom quintiles but decrease the CEV of
the highest income quintile to almost zero.
Surprisingly, higher consumption minimum oor increases the value of the annuity
market from 2.0% to 2.5% and this happens because of the change in the CEV of low-
income group. This is mostly driven by a change in the welfare of people whose preexisting
annuity income is below the high consumption oor, and without an annuity market they
quickly decumulate their assets and rely on government transfers. After gaining access
to the annuity market they can increase their annuity income above the level of cmin and
this gives them higher lifetime consumption.
G Theory
This section proves that certain assumptions retirees buy annuities only once in the
rst period.
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G.1 Auxiliary propositions
Auxiliary proposition 1 Assume there is no uncertainty except the time of death.
Then the following is true:
1 + qAFt+1
qAFt
=
1 + r
st
where qAFt is an actuarially fair annuity price dened as follows:
qAFt =
T tX
i=1
St+ijt
(1 + r)i
Proof Using the denition of actuarially fair annuity prices and the fact that St+ijt =
stSt+ijt+1 we can write:
qAFt =
st
(1 + r)
 
1 +
T tX
i=2
St+ijt+1
(1 + r)i 1
!
=
st
(1 + r)
 
1 + qAFt+1

This proves Auxiliary proposition 1.
Auxiliary proposition 2 Assume there is no uncertainty except the time of death.
Then the following is true:
1 + qt+1
qt
<
1 + r
st
where qt is the annuity price that includes administrative load, i.e. qt = q
AF
t .
Proof We can write the following relationship:
1 + qt+1
qt
=
1 + qAFt+1
qAFt
=
1= + qAFt+1
qAFt
<
1 + qAFt+1
qAFt
The last inequality follows from the fact that   1. By Auxiliary proposition 1
1 + qAFt+1
qAFt
=
1 + r
st
. Thus
1 + qt+1
qt
<
1 + r
st
, which proves Auxiliary proposition 2.
G.2 Assumptions
The proofs below rely on the following assumptions:
1. There is no uncertainty except the time of death.
2. Medical expenses are zero (zt=0).
3. (1 + r) < 1.
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4. Annuity prices satisfy the following condition:
1 + qt+1
qt
> 1 + r:25
5. The initial annuity income is above the consumption oor (n0 > cmin. )
6. There are no bequest motives.
G.3 Proof that people buy annuities only once in the rst pe-
riod
Proposition 1 Assume conditions 1-5 hold. Then if an agent's optimal investments
in annuities at time t+1 is positive (t+2 > 0) then he does not invest in bonds at time
t (kt+1 = 0).
Proof Suppose not. Consider Euler equations for an agent's investments in annu-
ities and bonds at time t. Given assumptions 5 and 6 we can write these equations as
follows:
u0(ct)qt   nt = stu0(ct+1)(1 + qt+1)  nt+1 (9)
u0(ct)  kt = st(1 + r)u0(ct+1) (10)
Here nt and 
k
t are Lagrange multipliers on constraints t+1  0 and kt+1  0 and they
satisfy the following conditions:
nt  0; ntt+1 = 0
kt  0; kt kt+1 = 0
Since t+2 > 0, we have 
n
t+1 = 0. By supposition, 
k
t = 0. Thus equations (9) and
(10) can be rewritten in the following way:
nt
qt
= u0(ct)  stu0(ct+1)1 + qt+1
qt
u0(ct) = st(1 + r)u0(ct+1)
Combining these equations we get:
nt
qt
= stu
0(ct+1)

(1 + r)  1 + qt+1
qt

Given assumption 4 this implies nt < 0 which contradicts the denition of Lagrange
multiplier. This contradiction proves Proposition 1.
25Note, this inequality is always true if prices are actuarially fair (see Auxiliary proposition 1).
35
Proposition 2 Assume conditions 1-5 hold. Then if at some time t an agent has
only annuity income and no liquid wealth he will not invest either in bonds or in annuities.
Proof If an agent does not invest neither in bonds nor in annuities he has: ct = nt
and ct+1 = nt. Consider if it is optimal for an agent to deviate from the strategy of not
investing at all and relying only on his annuity income. Consider rst the decision to
invest in bonds. If it is not optimal to have zero investments in bonds, than based on
the Euler equation (10) we can write the following:
u0(nt) < st(1 + r)u0(nt)
Rearranging this expression we get:
0 < (st(1 + r)  1)u0(nt)
This cannot be true because by assumption 3, st(1 + r) < 1. Thus it is not optimal to
deviate from no investments in bonds strategy.
Second, consider the decision to invest in annuities. We can rewrite equation (9) in
the following way:
nt
qt
= u0(ct)  stu0(ct+1)1 + qt+1
qt
+
nt+1
qt
=
u0(nt)

1  st1 + qt+1
qt

+
nt+1
qt
>
u0(nt) (1  (1 + r)) + 
n
t+1
qt
> 0
The last inequality follows from assumption 3 and the inequality before last - from
Auxiliary proposition 2. Thus nt > 0, i.e. it is not optimal to invest in annuities. This
nishes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Assume conditions 1-5 hold. If an agent buys annuities he will start
doing it in the rst period (2 > 0).
G.3.1 Proof
Suppose not. Without loss of generality, assume that an agent starts buying annuity
at time t = 2. Then by Proposition 1 he does not invest in bonds in period t = 1. Then
at time t = 2 he does not have liquid wealth. Then by Proposition 2 he does not invest
in annuities. This logic can be applied to every period. It proves Proposition 3.
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Proposition 4 Assume conditions 1-5 hold. If an agent buys annuities he will do
it only once in the rst period (2 > 0;3 = :: = T = 0).
Proof Suppose not. We know that an agent will start buying annuities in the rst
period. Suppose he also chooses to buy annuities at some period et > 1. Then at timeet   1 his investments in bonds are zero by Proposition 1. Then by Proposition 2 his
investments in annuities at time et are zero. This contradiction proves Proposition 4.
H Discussion of several features missing from the
model
This section discusses how some assumptions of the model can aect its main results.
H.1 Exogenous medical expenses
I assume that medical expenses are exogenous, i.e. people have no control over
their medical spending. In reality, medical spending has both discretionary and non-
discretionary parts. The non-discretionary part represents a risk which creates precau-
tionary demand for liquid assets and thus can decrease interest in illiquid annuities. The
results of this paper show that when comparing the model with and without exogenous
medical expenses, the annuity ownership rates change little, suggesting that this mecha-
nism does not represent a quantitatively important impediment to annuitization.
The discretionary part of medical expenses is usually modeled as investments in health
that increase utility (see, for example, Scholz and Seshadri, 2010). As such, it becomes
part of a portfolio choice problem. Yogo (2009) shows that when modeled in this way,
medical expenses do not represent an impediment to annuitization. On the contrary,
when gaining access to a frictionless annuity market, people can decrease their invest-
ments in health in order to invest in annuities. If people are allowed to move their invest-
ments from health to annuities, this means they have a way to increase their disposable
wealth by reducing medical expenses. The results of my study show that disposable
wealth is an important determinant of annuity demand. Thus this mechanism would
make the annuity puzzle harder to explain because we need to understand not only why
people do not convert their wealth to annuities, but also why they choose to invest in
health rather than annuities.
H.2 Long-term care insurance market
People who survive to very old ages are likely to face high medical expenses and a
substantial part of these expenses is represented by the costs of long-term care (Kopecky
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and Koreshkova, 2011). The risk of nursing home costs can be privately insured in the
market for long-term care insurance. I abstract from modeling this market. The presence
of explicit insurance against long-term care costs can change my results in two directions.
On the one hand, as Figure (1) shows, some retirees use annuities to insure their old
age medical care. Long-term care insurance can crowd out demand for annuities that are
used for this purpose. This can decrease the overall demand for annuities, especially for
people in high income quintiles.
On the other hand, there are some features of long-term care insurance contracts that
can increase demand for annuities. In particular, this contract requires annual payments
of premiums which will continue until a person goes to a nursing home. Given that such
long-term annual payments are cheaper to nance by buying annuities than by paying
for them out of savings, retirees can combine a purchase of annuities with purchase of
long-term care. In this case, long-term care insurance does not necessarily crowd out the
demand for annuities.
H.3 Absence of working-age stage of life
This study analyzes the decisions of retirees without considering the earlier stages
of their life-cycle. As shown by Scholz et al (2006), people in the US save optimally
for retirement. In other words, the initial distribution of wealth at retirement reects
the optimal decision making of people over the course of their working lives. Some
counterfactual experiments in this study involve a signicant change in the environment
that people are living in and this can lead to dierent behavior during earlier stages of
life. In particular, as shown by Kopecky and Koreshkova (2011), medical expenses in
retirement are an important factor increasing life-cycle savings. Eliminating this risk will
substantially reduce the initial endowment of wealth of retirees. This study shows that
the initial endowment of resources is an important determinant of the annuity demand.
Therefore allowing for a full life-cycle will likely lead to a more noticeable negative impact
of medical expenses on retirees' participation in the annuity market.
I Computation
I solve the model using backward induction. In the last period (t = T ), the value func-
tion (and policy functions) can be solved analytically. For every age t prior to T and for
each point in the state space, I optimize with respect to bonds and annuities. I solve the
two-dimensional optimization problem by applying, rst, a coarse grid search and then
the Brent method along both dimensions. The numerical integration of tomorrow's value
function was performed using Gauss-Legendre quadrature. This numerical integration
was complicated by the fact that the value function is not concave. The non-concavity
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arises because each period the agent can run out of assets due to medical expense shocks.
The probability of getting into this state is endogenous. To address this problem, in
numerical integration a \kink point"for each grid of tomorrow's assets is identied. The
\kink point"is a value of tomorrow's medical shock that lets an agent nance his medical
expenses and be left with an amount exactly equal to the consumption minimum oor.
Then the value function was integrated separately to the left and to the right of the
\kink point". I evaluate the value function for points outside the state space grid using
a linear interpolation. I discretize persistent and transitory shocks using the Tauchen-
Hussey algorithm. To create the simulation sample I draw with replacement 10,000,000
individuals from the sample described in Section 4. Each of these individuals is endowed
with the state vector (k0,n0,m0) drawn from the data. In addition, each individual is
assigned random shocks 0 and 0 where 0 is drawn from an invariant distribution.
To solve for the equilibrium in the annuity market I start by guessing a vector of
prices q0. To ensure that I trap the equilibrium price from below, I start with a very low
guess that corresponds to the price that people in the lowest quintile and bad health face
if their mortality is observed. Given this price I compute decision rules of households and
nd the new equilibrium price q1 implied by these decision rules using the equilibrium
condition (6). To ensure that the price vector changes very slowly from iteration n to
iteration n+ 1 I use the following update rule: qn+1 = 0:9qn 1 + 0:1qn
39
References
[1] Ameriks, J., Caplin, A., Laufer S., Van Nieuwerburgh, S., 2011. The Joy of Giving
or Assisted Living? Using Strategic Surveys to Separate Public Care Aversion from
Bequest Motives. Journal of Finance, 66(2), 519-561.
[2] Brown, J. R., 2001. Private pensions, mortality risk, and the decision to annuitize.
Journal of Public Economics, 82(1), 29-62.
[3] Brown, J. R., Poterba, J. 2000. Joint Life Annuities and Annuity Demand by Married
Couples. Jounal of Risk and Insurance, Vol 67(4), 527-553
[4] Brown, J.R., Davido, T., Diamond, P.A., 2005. Annuities and Individual Welfare.
American Economic Review, 95(5), 1573-1590.
[5] Brown, J. R., Mitchell, O. S., Poterba, J.M., 2001. The role of real annuities and
indexed bonds in an individual accounts retirement Program. In Campbell, J., Feld-
stein, M., Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 321-360.
[6] Brown, J. R., Warshawsky, M. J., 2004. Longevity insured retirement distributions
from pension plans: market and regulatory issues. In Gale, W., Shoven, J., War-
shawsky, M., Public Policies and Private Pensions. Brookings Institution.
[7] De Nardi, M., 2004. Wealth Inequality and Intergenerational Links. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 71(7), 743-768.
[8] De Nardi, M., French, E., Jones, J.B., 2010. Why do the Elderly Save? The Role of
Medical Expensess. Journal of Political Economy 118(1), 39-75
[9] Dushi, I., Webb, A., 2004. Household Annuitization Decisions: Simulations and
Empirical Analysis. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 3 (2), 109-143.
[10] French, E., John, J.B., 2004. On the distribution and dynamics of health care costs.
Journal of Applied Econometrics 19, 705-721.
[11] Hosseini, R., 2007. Adverse selection in the annuity market and the role for Social
Security. Mimeo, University of Minnesota.
[12] Hurd, M., McFadden, D., Merrill, A., 1999. Predictors of Mortality Among the
Elderly. In Wise, D., Themes in the Economics of Aging. University of Chicago
Press, pp. 171-197.
[13] Inkman J., Lopes, P., Michaelides, A., 2011. How Deep is the Annuity Market
Participation Puzzle? Review of Financial Studies, 2011, 24(1), 279-319.
[14] Kitao, S., Jeske, K., 2009. U.S. Tax Policy and Health Insurance Demand: Can a
Regressive Policy Improve Welfare? Journal of Monetary Economics, 56 (2), 210-
221.
[15] Kopecky, K. A., Koreshkova, T., 2011. The Impact of Medical and Nursing Home
Expenses and Social Insurance Policies on Savings and Inequality. Mimeo, Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
40
[16] Levy, R. A., Riley, W., Gabay, M., Nyman, J., Feldman, R., 2005. Analysis of the Use
of Annuities to Shelter Assets in State Medicaid Programs. The CNA Corporation
IPR 11277.
[17] Lockwood, L., 2012a. Bequest Motives and the Annuity Puzzle. Review of Economic
Dynamics, 15(2), 226-243.
[18] Lockwood, L., 2012b. Incidental Bequests: Bequest Motives and the Choice to Self-
Insure Late-Life Risks. Mimeo, NBER.
[19] Mitchell, O. S., Poterba, J.M., Warshawsky, M.J., Brown, J.R., 1999. New Evidence
on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities. American Economic Review 89(5),
1299-1318.
[20] Nakajima, M., Telyukova, I., 2011. Home Equity in Retirement. Mimeo, University
of California San Diego.
[21] Pang, G., Warshawsky, M.J., 2010. Optimizing the Equity-Bond-Annuity Portfolio
in Retirement: The Impact of Uncertain Health Expenses. Insurance: Mathematics
and Economics 46, 198-209.
[22] Pauly, M., 1974. Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
88(1), 44-62.
[23] Rohwedder, S., Haider, S., Hurd, M., 2006. Increases in wealth among the elderly in
the early 1990s: How Much Due to Survey Design? Review of Income and Wealth
52(4), 509-524.
[24] Scholz, J., Seshadri, A., Khitatrakun, S., 2006. Are Americans Saving \Opti-
mally"for Retirement? Journal of Political Economy, vol. 114(4), pages 607-643
[25] Scholz, J., Seshadri, A., 2010. Health and Wealth in a Lifecycle Model. Mimeo,
University of Wisconsin Madison
[26] Sinclair, S., Smetters, K., 2004. Health Shocks and the Demand for Annuities. Tech-
nical Paper Series 2004-9, Congressional Budget Oce.
[27] Turra, C.M., Mitchell, O.S., 2008. The Impact of Health Status and Out-of-Pocket
Medical Expenditures on Annuity Valuation. I Ameriks, J., and Mitchell, O., editors,
Recalibrating Retirement SPending and Saving, pages 227-250. Oxford University
Press.
[28] Walker, L., 2004. Elderly Households and Housing Wealth: Do They Use It or Lose
It? University of Michican Retirement Research Center, WP 2004-070.
[29] Walliser, J., 2000. Adverse selection in the annuities market and the impact of
privatizing Social Security. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(3), 373-393.
[30] Yaari, M.E., 1965. Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Con-
sumer. Review of Economic Studies, 32, 137-150.
[31] Yogo, M., 2008. Portfolio Choice in Retirement: Health Risk and the Demand for
Annuities, Housing, and Risky Assets. Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
41
